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EARNED SOVEREIGNTY:
THE

ROAD TO RESOLVING

THE CONFLICT OVER
Kosovo'S FINAL STATUS
PAUL R. WILLIAMS*

The classic nineteenth-century concept of sovereignty, even if it rarelypertained
in practice, was a concept of absolute territorialsovereignty. In the twenty-first
century, sovereignty is necessarily shared and dependent on agreements with a
range of internationalactors. I
-

Independent International Commission on Kosovo

Chaired by Justice Richard Goldstone
INTRODUCTION

This article is the third in a series of three articles which discuss the emerging
doctrine of "earned sovereignty." 2 The first article provided a detailed definition
of earned sovereignty, and its sub-components, and explained the historical and
political basis for the doctrine. The second article set forth the legal basis for the
doctrine. This article explores the competition between self-determination and
sovereignty in the conflict between Kosovo and Serbia, and tracks the efforts of the
international community to rely on the doctrine of earned sovereignty to resolve
the conflict.
. Holds the Rebecca Grazier Professorship of Law and International Relations, American University.
Ph.D., Cambridge 1998; J.D., Stanford Law School 1990; B.A., UC Davis 1987. From 1991-1993
Professor Williams served as an Attorney-Advisor in the U.S. Department of State's Office of the Legal
Advisor for European Affairs. During the course of his legal practice, Professor Williams has assisted
nearly a dozen states and sub-state entities in major international peace negotiations, and has served as a
delegation member in the Dayton, Rambouillet/Paris, Key West, Lake Ohrid/Skopje, and
Belgrade/Podgorica negotiations. He has also advised fifteen governments across Europe, Africa and
Asia on matters of public international law. The author is grateful for the extensive research assistance
provided by Jusuf Fuduli and Lucy Gillers.
1. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON Kosovo, THE FOLLOW-UP REPORT: WHY CONDITIONAL

INDEPENDENCE? 3 (2001), available at http://www.kosovocomission.org/reports/followup.pdf (last
visited Mar. 22, 2003) [hereinafter THE FOLLOW-UP OF THE KOSOvO REPORT].

2. For the first and second articles in this series as well as an introduction to earned sovereignty
see Michael P. Scharf, Earned Sovereignty: Juridical Underpinnings, 31 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
373 (2004) and James R. Hooper & Paul R. Williams, Earned Sovereignty: The PoliticalDimension,
31 DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'v 355 (2004).
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The purpose of this article is to promote a more complete understanding of
the approach of earned sovereignty by examining in detail its role in efforts to
resolve the Kosovo conflict. To accomplish this purpose, the article explains how
the approach of earned sovereignty shaped the international community's response
to the conflict in Kosovo, and how, if properly applied, it may help to bring about a
resolution of this particularly vexing sovereignty-based conflict; and thereby
enhance prospects for a long term peace in the region. The article also tracks the
substantive evolution of the approach from 1998 to the present, and explores the
extent to which policy makers and others adapted the approach in response to the
changing factual situation of the conflict, and the perceived viability of the
approach as a means for resolving the conflict. Finally, the article highlights the
highly fluid nature of "sovereignty" in the context of the Kosovo conflict.
As noted in the introductory note3, the conflict-resolution approach of earned
sovereignty essentially seeks to resolve the centuries-old tension between selfdetermination and sovereignty by managing the devolution of sovereign authority
and functions from a state to a sub-state entity. In some instances the sub-state
entity may acquire sufficient sovereign authority and functions which will then
enable it to seek international recognition, while in others the sub-state entity may
only acquire sufficient authority and functions to enable it to operate within a
stable system of internal autonomy.4
The conflict resolution approach of earned sovereignty may be characterized
as encompassing six elements - three core elements and three optional elements.
The first core element is shared sovereignty. In each case of earned
sovereignty the state and sub-state entity may both exercise sovereign authority
and functions over a defined territory. In some instances, international institutions
may also exercise sovereign authority and functions in addition to or in lieu of the
parent state. In rare cases, the international community may exercise shared
sovereignty with an internationally recognized state. In almost all instances an
international institution is responsible for monitoring the parties exercise of their
authority and functions.
The second core element is institution building. This element is utilized
during the period of shared sovereignty prior to the determination of final status.
Here the sub-state entity, frequently with the assistance of the international
community, undertakes to construct institutions for self-government and to build
institutions capable of exercising increasing sovereign authority and functions.
The third core element is the eventual determination of the final status of the
sub-state entity and its relationship to the state. In many instances the status will

3. See Paul R. Williams, Michael P. Scharf & James R. Hooper, Resolving Sovereignty-Based
Conflicts: The EmergingApproach of EarnedSovereignty, 31 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 349 (2004)
4. While at its essence earned sovereignty is a political approach that grew from the need to
structure creative and workable solutions to conflicts arising from the tension between selfdetermination and sovereignty, it is well-founded in the most basic principles of international law. See
Michael P. Scharf, Earned Sovereignty: JuridicalUnderpinnings, 31 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 373
(2004)
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be determined by a referendum, while in others it may involve a negotiated
settlement between the state and sub-state entity, often with international
mediation. Invariably the determination of final status for the sub-state entity
involves the consent of the international community in the form of international
recognition.
The first optional element is phased sovereignty. Phased sovereignty entails
the accumulation by the sub-state entity of increasing sovereign authority and
functions over a specified period of time prior to the determination of final status.
The second optional element is conditional sovereignty. Conditionality may
be applied to the accumulation of increasing sovereign authority and functions by
the sub-state entity, or it may be applied to the determination of the sub-state
entity's final status. In either case the sub-state entity is required to meet certain
benchmarks before it may acquire increased. These benchmarks may include
conditions such as protecting human and minority rights, developing democratic
institutions, instituting the rule of law, and promoting regional stability. While the
relationship between the attainment of certain benchmarks and the devolution of
authority, or recognition as an independent state may be formally expressed, there
may often be an informal relationship.
The third optional element, constrained sovereignty, involves continued
limitations on the sovereign authority and functions of the new state, such as
continued international administrative and/or military presence, and limits on the
right of the state to undertake territorial association with other states.
In almost all instances the state and sub-state entity progress through the
phases of earned sovereignty by mutual agreement, but in some instances, such as
Kosovo, the international community may support or initiate one or more of the
phases of earned sovereignty against the wishes of the state or sub-state entity.
As a relatively new approach to conflict resolution, earned sovereignty, has
been referred to by many names, including intermediate sovereignty, phased
recognition, provisional statehood, and conditional independence. Conflicts in
which variations on the approach of earned sovereignty have been proposed or
applied include the Palestinian Road Map for Peace (with provisional statehood);
the Northern Ireland Accords (with a referendum for independence and unification
with Ireland after seven years); East Timor (with phased sovereignty leading to full
independence); the Sudan Machakos Protocol (with an independence referendum
by Southern Sudan after six years); the UN proposal for Western Sahara (with
shared sovereignty for four years and then an independence referendum by the fifth
year); the transformation of the FRY into the Union of Serbia and Montenegro
(with provision for a referendum on Montenegrin independence within three
years); the recent proposal by President Musharef of Pakistan for a Roadmap for
Peace for Kashmir, and most recently the initiation of the Philippine/Moro Islamic
Liberation Front negotiations (with the express conditioning of US financial
assistance on progress in a number of areas).
As will be discussed below, in the case of Kosovo the approach of earned
sovereignty was developed in an ad hoc and halting manner beginning as a
proposed initiative by the Public International Law & Policy Group working with
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the International Crisis Group, and then becoming a core element of the
Rambouillet Peace Accords and UN Security Council Resolution 1244. The
approach was then further refined and developed by a number of expert
commissions and think tanks, including the Goldstone Commission, the
International Crisis Group, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
and came to form the basis of the current United Nations doctrine of Standards
before Status. Throughout its development and application, the earned sovereignty
approach competed for influence with the alternative approach of stability through
accommodation and was shaped by the compromises inherent in the foreign policy
decision making process. In the end, the debate yielded a more refined approach
which appears to present the greatest opportunity for facilitating a viable and
lasting settlement of the centuries old dispute over the sovereignty of Kosovo.
OVERVIEW

The history of the territory of Kosovo is marked by near perpetual
competition for sovereign control between Kosovar Albanians and Serbs.5 Great
powers, such as Germany and Italy, and now the United Nations, have also played
important roles in the allocation of sovereignty over Kosovo. Throughout the
history of competition, sovereignty has ebbed and flowed from the Kosovar
Albanians to the Serbs and back again. Frequently, the competition for sovereign
control is accompanied by mass atrocities and human rights violations.
Throughout the 1990s, the competition for sovereign control led to increasingly
intolerable human rights abuses by the government of Serbia against the people of
Kosovo.
In an effort to break the cycle of retribution, to highlight the need for a
comprehensive approach to resolving the conflict, and to fill the diplomatic deficit
created by the lack of a coherent response by the European Union, in November
1998 the Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG) defined and proposed
the adoption of the approach of intermediate sovereignty.6 This approach sought to
serve as a basis for structuring the phased reduction of Serbian sovereign control
over Kosovo, and for allowing the people of Kosovo to accumulate sovereign
authority and functions in a manner protecting the legitimate interests of the
Serbian minority in Kosovo and of the international community. 7
The key elements of the 1998 PILPG approach involved the creation of a
system whereby the people of Kosovo, through legitimate political bodies, would
be entitled to exercise certain sovereign rights, while simultaneously retaining
specified links to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 8 (FRY). 9 As a condition for
5. See generally JULIE A. MERTUS, Kosovo: How MYTHS AND TRUTHS STARTED A WAR (1999)
and TIM JUDAH, Kosovo: WAR AND REVENGE (2000).
6. See PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLICY GROUP FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP,
INTERMEDIATE SOVEREIGNTY AS A BASIS FOR RESOLVING THE Kosovo CRISIS (1998) available at

htp://www.crisisweb.org/projects/showreport.cfm?reportid=l 71 (last visited Jan. 2, 2003).
7. Id.
8. On February 4, 2003, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia officially changed its name to Serbia
and Montenegro. See Vesna Peric Zimonjic, Politics - Yugoslavia: A Country Disappears,INTER
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attaining greater sovereign authority and functions, the people of Kosovo and their
political institutions would have to: guarantee the protection of the rights of all
minority populations within Kosovo; respect the territorial integrity of neighboring
states such as Macedonia and Albania; renounce any intention of political or
territorial association with Albania; and accept Kosovo's borders as confirmed by
the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution. After the three-to-five-year period, Kosovo
would be entitled, subject to an internationally conducted referendum within
Kosovo, to pursue recognition from the international community.' ° Once Kosovo
earned international recognition it would continue to be bound by its obligations to
protect minority rights, maintain its current borders, and reject any political or
territorial association with Albania."
Within two months of the release of the report, the failure of the then-current
approach of stability through accommodation, 12 and the necessity of a new
approach, became apparent when Ambassador William Walker proclaimed the
massacre of over forty civilians by Serbian security forces at Racak to be a crime
against humanity. 13 Public reaction in the United States and Europe to the
massacre allowed key American foreign policymakers to push for the convening of
peace negotiations backed by the threat of the use of force.14
At the Rambouillet/Paris negotiations, the American and European
negotiators reached agreement on a proposal for an Interim Agreement for Peace
and Self-Government in Kosovo, which embodied many of the core elements of
earned sovereignty. 15 Most importantly, the Accords provide that three years after
the entry into force of the Agreement an international meeting would be convened
to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo. The meeting would
take into consideration, among other criteria, whether the Kosovar Albanians had
fulfilled obligations to establish democratic institutions and to protect human and
minority rights. 16 An assessment of the will of the people would also guide the

PRESS SERVICE,

Feb. 4, 2003. For purposes of clarity, however, the former name will be used in this

article.
9. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLICY GROUP, supra note 5, at i.
10. Id. at 38.
11. Id.
12. This approach entailed supporting Serbian sovereign control over Kosovo while attempting to
persuade the Serbian regime to halt its atrocities against the people of Kosovo.
13. See BBC News Online, "Racak Killings 'Crime Against Humanity,"' (Mar. 17, 1999) at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/298131.stm (last visited Jan. 2, 2003); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
YUGOSLAv

GOVERNMENT

WAR

CRIMES

IN

RACAK,

(1999

World

Report)

available

at

http://www.hrw.org/press/ 1999/jan/yugo0129.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2003).
14. See Radio Netherlands, "Walker: 'Racak Massacre Was Not Faked,"' (June 14, 2002) at
http://www.mw.nl/hotspots/html/ictyO2O6l3.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2003).

15. Rambouillet Accords, Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Govemment in Kosovo, Feb. 23,
1999, U.N. Doe. S/1999/648 (June 7, 1999) available at http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/99648_ I.pdf
(last visited Jan. 2, 2003) [hereinafter Rambouillet Accords]. It is useful to note that while the concept
of earned sovereignty was originally articulated as "intermediate sovereignty," and subsequently
referred to as "conditional independence," the most descriptive reference to the concept is "earned
sovereignty".
16. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLICY GROUP, supra note 5,38.
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final decision.17
The draft Accords were agreed to by the Kosovar Albanians, but rejected by
Mr. Milosevic, who sought to resolve the competition over sovereignty by
ethnically cleansing Kosovo of its Albanian population.' 8 To prevent this, the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launched an air campaign.' 9 NATO
halted the air campaign when Milosevic agreed to transfer de facto sovereign
control over Kosovo to the United Nations and NATO.
The U.N. Security Council then adopted Resolution 1244 to provide a
framework for the interim administration of Kosovo by the United Nations. 0
While retaining the core elements of the Rambouillet Accords, Resolution 1244
gave a primary role to the U.N. mission in overseeing the development of
democratic institutions (an added and now necessary element to the approach of
earned sovereignty). 21 The United Nations was then to devolve sovereign
authority and functions to these new institutions and to facilitate a political process
designed to determine Kosovo's future status based on the process described in the
Rambouillet Accords.
Acting under the authority of Resolution 1244, the Special Representative of
the Secretary-General (SRSG) displaced the FRY's ability to exercise sovereign
authority and functions in Kosovo and began the process of building Kosovar
institutions, but hesitated in transferring substantial sovereign responsibility to the
people of Kosovo.
In response to the perceived failure of the United Nations to articulate a clear
plan for transferring sovereign authority and functions to Kosovo as required under
Resolution 1244, the Goldstone Commission renewed the call for earned
sovereignty for the people of Kosovo.22 The key elements of the Goldstone
proposal, termed conditional independence, included the prompt holding of a
referendum to ascertain the will of the people, the initiation of U.N.-sponsored
talks between the Kosovar Albanians and the Kosovar Serbs, the development of
mechanisms to protect minority and human rights, arrangements for the continued
presence of international security forces, and the phased transfer of effective
administration from the United Nations to the legitimate national and municipal
authorities.23

17. Id.
18. For the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia's indictment detailing
Milosevic's ethnic cleansing campaign see ICTY Prosecutor, IT-99-37, Indictment against Milosevic et
al. (May 22, 1999).
19. See Radio Netherlands, supra note 12.
20. See SC Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 401 lth mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999)
availableat http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/ 1999/sc99.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2003)..
21. Id. at para. 10.
22. INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON Kosovo, THE Kosovo REPORT: CONFLICT,
at
284
(2000)
available
LESSONS
LEARNED,
RESPONSE,
INTERNATIONAL
http://www.kosovocommission.org/reports (last visited Oct. 14, 2002) [hereinafter THE KOsOvO
REPORT].
23. Id.
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Subsequent to the release of the Goldstone proposal, the United Nations
began a process of building up Kosovar institutions and devolving power to those
institutions. During this time, and with little input from the Kosovar political
leadership, the Americans and the Europeans negotiated a Constitutional
Framework for Provisional Self-Government, which was promulgated by the
24
United Nations and laid the foundation for an approach of phased sovereignty.
The Constitutional Framework provided for the development of a unique dual key
system of initial and primary responsibility for the SRSG and Kosovar institutions.
The dual key approach of shared sovereign functions was coupled with a mandate
for the provisional institutions of self-government to conduct their work with a
view to facilitating the determination of Kosovo's future status through a process,
which would take full account of all relevant factors including the will of the
people.
Despite significant progress toward earned sovereignty, with the fall of
Milosevic and other important political changes, there was increasing pressure by
the European Union to reign in the devolution of sovereign authority and functions
to Kosovo in an effort to promote perceived democratic reform in Serbia proper.
In light of the dangers posed by a halt to the process of earned sovereignty for
Kosovo, the Goldstone Commission issued a second, more detailed, proposal for
conditional independence.25 The basic elements of the proposal included the rapid
devolution of authority to Kosovar institutions, and substantial limiting of SRSG
authority to include only protection of minorities, guarantee of human rights and
the guarantee of border integrity. The SRSG powers were to be exercised only
when the locally elected officials fail to meet their obligations. According to the
Commission, the presence of the international community should be diminished
and the sovereign authority of Kosovo should continue to grow as the government
and people of Kosovo proved themselves capable of meeting the above
commitments. As Kosovo fully met these commitments, the member states of the
international community would grant it international recognition.
In partial response to the efforts of the Goldstone Commission and others, the
new SRSG for Kosovo, Michael Steiner, embarked on a process of indicating that
Kosovo would not likely return to Serbian sovereign control, and of devolving
greater power to the Kosovar authorities.
Seeking to support this renewed initiative for earned sovereignty, while
recognizing the slow nature of political institution building in Kosovo, the
International Crisis Group (ICG) put forth a detailed proposal for a mixing of
international trusteeship and earned sovereignty for Kosovo. 26 The cornerstone of
the proposal was a call for immediate negotiations on final status, with the United
Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to then transfer increasing sovereign
22. See generally Regulation No. 2001/9 On a Constitutional Framework for Provisional SelfGovernment, U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc.
UNMIKJREG/2001/9 (2001) available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2001/reg09-OI.htm
(last visited Jan. 2, 2003).
25. See generally THE FOLLOW-UP OF THE Kosovo REPORT, supra note 1.
26. See PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY GROUP, supra note 5.
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authority and functions to Kosovar institutions, retaining only limited veto power
in certain areas.27
Under increasing international pressure to adopt a clear approach for
resolving the crisis over Kosovo's final status, the SRSG adopted a strategy
referred to as "standards before status."2 8 While ostensibly rejecting conditional
independence, this approach contains most of the basic elements of earned
sovereignty. It calls for the measured devolution of sovereign authority and
functions to Kosovar institutions as they demonstrate capacity to operate
effectively and meet select criteria. However, the approach also suspends any
discussion of final status until after certain standards are met. At its essence, the
standards before status approach simply suspends the political discussion over final
status and sets in motion the construction of Kosovar institutions which will likely
ensure an independent Kosovo.
THE COMPETITION FOR SOVEREIGNTY OVER Kosovo

On December 1, 1918, following the end of World War I, Kosovo became a
part of The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which subsequently became
Yugoslavia, though never legally part of Serbia.29 In 1919, in response to a denial
of their basic human rights, including the right to education in the Albanian
language, an estimated 10,000 rebels took up arms against the central government
of the Kingdom. The suppression of this revolt involved the commission of
widespread atrocities against Kosovar Albanians, the arming of Serbian civilians,
and the relocation of Kosovar Albanian women and children to internment camps
in central Serbia. 30 In an attempt to change the ethnic make-up of Kosovo, the
central government accelerated a colonization program, promising sizable tracts of
land and exemption from taxes for ethnic Serbs willing to relocate to Kosovo. 3 '
In 1929, Yugoslavia was divided into nine governorships, with the territory of
Kosovo being dispersed amongst three governorships.32 From that time until
World War II, much of the land held by Kosovar Albanians was confiscated and
transferred to the state. In 1933, the government of Yugoslavia sought to resolve
the claim to sovereignty by relocating much of the Albanian population to Turkey,
and began negotiations with the government of Turkey to accomplish this
objective. In 1938, an agreement was reached with Turkey to forcibly relocate as
many as 400,000 Kosovar Albanians, but the outbreak of World War II prevented
the parties from carrying out the agreement.33
27. Id. at i.
28. Press Release, United Nations Mission in Kosovo, Address to Security Council by Michael
Steiner, Special Representative of the Secretary-General (July 30, 2002), available at
http://www.unmikonline.org/press/2002/pressr/pr792.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2003).
29. See generallyNOEL MALCOLM, Kosovo: A SHORT HISTORY (1998).
30. See id.
at 273-76.
31. See MALCOLM supra note 27 at 280-81. It is estimated that approximately 14,000 families
settled in Kosovo because of the colonization program. Id.
32. See id.
at 283.
33. See id.
at 285-86.
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During World War II, when Axis forces occupied Yugoslavia, Kosovo was
partitioned between Bulgaria, Albania (governed by Italy), and Germany.
Following the end of the war, when the state of Yugoslavia was reconstituted, the
1946 Yugoslav constitution provided that Kosovo would be an Autonomous
Region within the Republic of Serbia. Although the 1946 Yugoslav constitution
did not address in detail the rights and obligations of the Autonomous Region of
Kosovo, the separate Serb Republic constitution provided that Kosovo would
direct its own economic and cultural development and that it would be responsible
for protecting the rights of its citizens.34 At this time, the Yugoslav government
relaxed the restrictions on the use of the Albanian language and reduced the
intensity of the colonization program, which had been halted during the war during which many of the Serbian colonists had been forced to return to Serbian
territory.
In 1963, Yugoslavia adopted a new constitution, which promoted Kosovo to
an Autonomous Province, but effectively decreased some of its federal rights. In
1968, the constitution was amended to provide Autonomous Provinces the status of
"socio-political communities" which was the same term used to describe the other
republics making up Yugoslavia.3 5 In early 1969, the Kosovar Albanians were
permitted to fly the Albanian flag as their "national emblem," and later that year
the University of Prishtina was established. Throughout the 1970s the Kosovar
Albanians increased their participation in the economic sector, political
bureaucracy and local police forces, with Kosovar Albanians holding two-thirds of
the membership in the local League of Communists, and three-fourths of the
membership in the local police and security forces.36
In 1974, Yugoslavia adopted yet another constitution, which provided that the
Autonomous Province of Kosovo, as well as the Autonomous Province of
Vojvodina, would be entitled to a sovereign status nearly equivalent to that of the
other six republics of Yugoslavia. As a result, Kosovo adopted its own
constitution, appointed its own representative on the rotating federal Presidency
and elected Parliamentarians to the federal Parliament.
In the early 1980s, after Tito's death, and in response to perceived and real
discrimination by the Kosovar Albanians, the Kosovar Serbs began to agitate for a
return to the earlier political system, in which the Kosovar Serbs held greater
privilege and power. In 1985, the Serbian Academy of Sciences drafted a
"Memorandum," which essentially called for a revocation of the sovereign
authority and functions accorded Kosovo under the 1974 constitution, and the
creation of a greater Serbia.37 In 1987, Slobodan Milosevic, then a deputy to the
President of the Serbian Party, traveled to Kosovo to hear demands by Kosovar
Serbs. In response to an orchestrated riot by Serbian nationalists, Milosevic
delivered an extemporaneous speech calling for the "defence of the sacred rights of
34.
35.
36.
37.

Seeid at 289-93,315-17.
See id. at 324-25.
See id. at 326.
For a comprehensive collection of the texts central to the operation of Serb nationalism, see LE
NET7OYAGE ETHNIQUE (Mirko Grmek et al. eds., 1993)
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the Serbs. 38 In late 1987, Milosevic used the growing political unrest in Kosovo
as a platform for assuming the presidency of the Serbian League of Communists.
In early 1988, the Serbian Assembly adopted amendments to the Serbian
constitution which removed Kosovo's control over the Kosovar police force,
criminal and civil courts, civil defense, and economic, social and education policy.
The amendments also effectively prohibited the use of Albanian as an official
language in Kosovo. To force these amendments through the Kosovar Parliament
as required by the Federal constitution, members of the Serbian security forces
surrounded the Kosovar Parliament building with tanks and armored personnel
carriers, and inserted special police and communist party functionaries amongst the
Kosovar delegates. 39 These actions were met by mass demonstrations of the
Kosovar Albanian population and resulted in the declaration of a state of
emergency in Kosovo by the Serbian regime.
In March and June of 1990, the Assembly of the Republic of Serbia issued a
series of decrees meant to entice Serbs to return to Kosovo, while suppressing the
rights of the Kosovar Albanians. The decrees for instance created new "Serb only"
municipalities, forbade the sale of property to Albanians by departing Serbs, closed
the Albanian language newspaper, closed the Kosovo Academy of Sciences, and
dismissed several thousand Kosovar Albanian state employees. 40 In response, on
July 2, 1990, the Albanian members of the Kosovo Assembly declared Kosovo "an
equal and independent entity within the framework of the Yugoslav federation. 41
The Serbian regime reacted by dissolving the Kosovo Assembly and the
government. Finally, in late 1990 the Serbian regime expelled 80,000 Kosovar
Albanians from state employment.
The members of the dissolved Albanian assembly responded by holding a
secret meeting and creating a constitutional law for the Republic of Kosovo, and
then holding a referendum on the question of whether Kosovo should be declared a
sovereign and independent republic. According to Kosovar Albanian sources,
eighty-seven percent of eligible voters participated in the vote, with ninety-nine
percent voting in favor of independence. Subsequently, using the same procedure
of underground voting, the Kosovar Albanians held an election on May 24, 1992,
whereby they elected a new assembly and government.4 2 In the spring of 1998, the
Kosovar Albanians held a second round of parliamentary elections as required by
their constitutional law.
From 1989, the Kosovar Albanians were denied the ability to exercise any
sovereign authority or functions or even to participate in the federal government.
They were also denied the ability to participate in the local formal political
structures responsible for determining the political fate of Kosovo. In addition, the
Kosovar Albanians were subjected to a systematic denial of their basic human

38. MALCOLM, supra note 27, at 341-42.

39. See id.
at 343-45.
40. MALCOLM, supra note 27, at 345-46.

41. See id.at 346.
42. Id. at 347.
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rights, which included a policy of arbitrary arrests, police violence, detention
incommunicado, torture, summary imprisonment and economic marginalization.
As a result, in the mid 1990s some elements of the Kosovar Albanian population
formed the Kosovo Liberation Army, which murdered members of the Serbian
police and military forces and perceived Kosovar Albanian collaborators.
Commencing in the winter of 1998, Serbian forces engaged in a brutal
crackdown in Kosovo ostensibly aimed at extinguishing the KLA and its popular
support, but in reality aimed at ethnically cleansing large swaths of Kosovo. As
part of their campaign, the Serbian forces terrorized local civilian populations,
murdered vast numbers of noncombatants, and laid siege to numerous villages.43
The results of the new campaign of Serbian ethnic aggression were that over
350,000 civilians were displaced and over 18,000 homes were deliberately
destroyed, and almost half of the population centers were subject to siege. The
intensity of the campaign of terror, ostensibly to drive the KLA from Kosovo,
rapidly increased in the autumn of 1998.
In the face of such atrocities, the United States and Europe responded with
humanitarian assistance, mild economic sanctions," and public declarations of the
need to stop the atrocities. Although the United States and Europe had eventually
been compelled to use force in Bosnia and had stationed over 30,000 troops to
prevent renewed hostilities there, they initially eschewed even the threat of force in
45
Kosovo.

At this point, the task of the international community evolved into an effort to
halt Serbian atrocities in Kosovo and devise a means to peacefully resolve the
dispute over the sovereignty of Kosovo.
EARNED SOVEREIGNTY AS AN APPROACH TO RESOLVING THE KOSOVO CONFLICT

Throughout the summer of 1998 the United States and its European allies
sought a negotiated settlement of the crisis in Kosovo." Despite the history of
Serbian atrocities and aggression in Croatia and Bosnia, America and its allies
43. For a review of the atrocities committed, see Human Rights Watch, at http://www.hrw.org
(last visited Jan. 2, 2003); the reports of the Kosovo Verification Mission, at
http://www.osce.org/Kosovo (last visited Jan. 2, 2003).
44. CNN.com, Calm Returns to Montenegro on Inauguration Day Jan. 15, 1998 at
htp://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9801/15/montenegro (last visited Jan. 2, 2003) (statement of U.S. envoy

to the Balkans Robert Gelbard).
45. See Press Conference of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, Special Envoy, and Ambassador
William Walker, Director of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, On-the-recordBriefing, released
by the Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Dep.'t of State (Oct. 28,
1998), available at
http://www.mthoyoke.edu/acad/intrel/holb.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2003).
46. The draft agreements prepared by the United States generally sought to accommodate the
Serbian interests in the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the FRY, while providing certain human
rights protections for the people of Kosovo. Like the Dayton Accords, the draft agreements proposed a
complicated system of government which was likely to lead to political gridlock. On the whole the
draft agreements minimized the emphasis on self-determination and rather placed the emphasis on
sovereignty. While there was some hint of earned sovereignty in the draft text it represented the more
traditional approach to resolving such conflicts - and was as a result unsuccessful.
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were highly reluctant to use, or threaten the use of, force. As a result of the
perceived weakness of the international community, the Serbian interlocutors
bogged the talks down in technical negotiations over arcane power sharing
arrangements, and Mr. Milosevic's forces increasingly relied upon violence against
the civilian population to secure Serbia's hold over Kosovo.
Recognizing the necessity of a shift in approach, the Public International Law
& Policy Group published a monograph through the International Crisis Group in
the fall of 1998. This monograph argued that the only means for resolving the
crisis in a manner that would protect the lives of the two million Kosovar
Albanians, while not destabilizing the region, would be for the international
community to intervene and oversee a three-to-five-year period of transition.
During this period of transition, Kosovo would assume increasing levels of
sovereign authority and functions from Serbia, so long as it met certain conditions.
The approach was dubbed intermediate sovereignty.
According to the proposal, the people of Kosovo, through legitimate political
bodies, would be entitled to exercise certain sovereign rights, while simultaneously
retaining specified links to the FRY. In exchange for the assumption of these
rights, the people of Kosovo would commit to respect fundamental principles of
international law. This arrangement would exist for a period of three to five years.
After this period, Kosovo would be entitled, subject to an internationally
conducted referendum within Kosovo, to pursue recognition from the international
community. 47 The assessment of the will of the people of Kosovo through a
legitimate referendum served as a cornerstone of the approach of intermediate
sovereignty.
The proposal provided that during the interim period, the people of Kosovo
would exercise complete legislative, executive and judicial control over their
internal affairs relating to the key areas of economic development, internal
security, education, taxation, extraction and processing of natural resources,
transportation, health care, media and news broadcasting, cultural development,
and the protection of minority rights. To a certain degree the institutions of
Kosovo would be permitted 48to conduct their own international affairs and appoint
international representatives.
In exchange for the exercise of these rights, the people and institutions of
Kosovo would be required to guarantee the rights of all minority populations
within Kosovo, respect the territorial integrity of neighboring states such as
Macedonia and Albania, renounce any intention of political or territorial
association with Albania, and accept its borders as confirmed by the 1974
Yugoslav Constitution. The proposal also indicated that Kosovar representatives
would be permitted to participate in the government of the FRY to the degree
necessary to ensure an effective transition to its own international status.49
To ensure the protection of the rights of the Albanian, Serbian and other
47. See PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLICY GROUP, supra note 5, at i.
48. Id.
49. See id.
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inhabitants of Kosovo, international monitors from the Organization for Security
and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union, as well as
independent non-governmental organizations, would be authorized to establish
monitoring missions and accorded complete and unrestricted access to Kosovo.
The proposal envisioned these organizations would publicly report their findings.
The key to the success of the proposal rested on the agreement of the Serbian and
Yugoslav police, military and paramilitary forces to withdraw from Kosovo within
six months and to permit international organizations to monitor this withdrawal. °
Upon the expiration of the interim period, the conditions for recognition of
Kosovo would include the traditional legal criteria of territory, population,
government and capacity to conduct international relations. Additionally, they
would include the political criteria of whether Kosovo had fulfilled its commitment
to protect the rights of all minority populations within its territory, respected the
territorial integrity of Macedonia and Albania, rejected any political or territorial
association with Albania, and maintained the status of its borders.
Once
recognized by the international community, Kosovo would remain bound by these
commitments, and would cease its participation in the Yugoslav federal

government. 1
The report sought to base the approach of intermediate sovereignty upon the
basic principles of international law, which provide that all self-identified groups
with a coherent identity and connection to a defined territory are entitled to
collectively determine their political destiny in a democratic fashion, and to be free
from systematic persecution. The report then reasoned that in cases where selfidentified groups are effectively denied their right to democratic self-government
and are consequently subjected to gross violations of their human rights, the most
reasonable course of action is for the international community to support
international status for the sub-state entity in order to ensure the protection of those
rights.52 While this proposition remains the subject of debate among international
lawyers, it is increasingly accepted as a viable means for protecting a population
from further gross violations of human rights in certain circumstances.
The 1998 proposal also drew legal support from the following factors: 1) the
legal and factual similarity between Kosovo and the other republics of the former
Yugoslavia, which were deemed by the international community to be entitled to
international recognition; 53 2) the legal precedent of earned recognition established
by the international community in recognizing Slovenia, Croatia, BosniaHerzegovina and Macedonia after they met specific conditions; 54 3) the fact that
Yugoslavia had dissolved, and the international community had rejected
Serbia/Montenegro's claim to continue its international legal personality;55 4) the
historical fact that Kosovo, while legitimately part of Yugoslavia, had never been

50. Id.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at i.
Id. at ii.
Id. at 28-29.
Id. at 29-32.

55. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLICY GROUP, supra note 5, at 33-35.
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legitimately incorporated into Serbia; 56 5) the fact that the people of Kosovo had
been subjected to ethnic aggression;57 and 6) at the time the recent precedent set by
the Russian/Chechen Accords and the Northern Ireland Peace Agreement. 58
The key themes of the 1998 PILPG proposal were that the people of Kosovo
had to a certain degree earned a right to increased sovereignty because of the long
history of human rights violations perpetrated against them by the Serbian regime.
Given the circumstances of their situation, it appeared that the only means for
adequately protecting those rights would be some form of international status for
Kosovo.
In order to ensure, however, that the attainment of international status for
Kosovo did not have negative consequences in the region, or lead to additional
violations of human rights, it was necessary to establish a process whereby the
international community could manage the development of an independent Kosovo
and ensure the protection of its interests in regional stability. The corollary
element was that the Kosovars, while entitled to heightened sovereignty because of
past abuses by the Serbian regime, would be required to earn full sovereignty at the
end of an interim period by demonstrating their commitment to democratic selfgovernment, the protection of human rights, and promotion of regional security.
While not explicitly stated in the 1998 PILPG Report, the report provided support
for the notion that certain specified limits on sovereignty might continue after
Kosovo had attained international recognition. 59
While the approach of intermediate sovereignty resonated with the policymaking community in the United States and Europe (and would later form the
basis for their proposal at Rambouillet), and was adopted in principle by the
government of Kosovo, 60 it was dismissed by President Milosevic - who was
determined to pursue a program of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.6 1
THE INITIAL INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

To implement ethnic cleansing, the Serbian regime began to round up
Kosovar Albanian men, and place them in camps reminiscent of the Bosnian
concentration camps. 62 In the face of increasing atrocities, the United States and

56. Id. at 33.
57. Id. at 35-36.
58. Id. at 36-38.

59. See generally PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLICY GROUP, supra note 5.
60. In part as a result of the 1998 PILPG Report, two members of Group were invited to serve as
experts on the Kosovo delegation to the Rambouillet talks. While at Rambouillet and Paris they further
developed and advocated for the utilization of the approach of earned sovereignty.
61. For details on Milosevic's plan to resolve the Kosovo crisis through ethnic cleansing, see
Kosovo/Kosova As Seen, As Told, An Analysis of the Human Rights Findings of the OSCE Kosovo
Verification Mission, October 1998 to June 1999 (June 9, 1999) available at http://www.osce.org/
kosovo/documents/reports/
hr/partl/index.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2003) (Chapter 14 recounts the forced expulsion of Kosovo
Albanians from Kosovo).
62. See UN Warns of Bosnia-type Horrorsas 600 Held by Serbs, Irish Times, Sept. 9, 1998, at 10
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Europe marshaled political and public support for the use of air strikes against
Serbian forces,63 and dispatched Ambassador Richard Holbrooke on a mission to
the FRY to negotiate an arrangement for the deployment of international monitors.
The resulting Holbrooke/Milosevic deal provided for the stationing of unarmed
monitors" and the provision for unarmed NATO over flight. 65 The weakness of
the deal aside, the primary effect was to temporarily diffuse international support
for the use of force to protect Kosovar Albanians by prying sovereign control over
Kosovo from Yugoslavia.
In light of the unarmed nature of the monitors and the perceived retrenchment
from the threat to use force, the Serbian regime continued its attacks on the civilian
population. Public criticism and demand for action reached a peak shortly after

January 15, 1999, when Serbian military and paramilitary forces massacred over
40 civilians in the Kosovar town of Racak. The massacre was met by a series of
public denunciations by President Clinton, 66 Secretary of State Albright,67 the
Chairman
of the OSCE, 68 the European Union, and U.N. Secretary-General Kofi
69
Annan.

As a result of the Racak massacre, the collapse of the Holbrooke/Milosevic
deal, the apparent failure of earlier mediation efforts, and political pressure
(especially from the U.S. Congress), the United States led its allies from the
approach of accommodation and sovereignty first to one of "diplomacy backed by
force.

7°

(comments of Kris Janowski, UNHCR Spokesman, on Serbia's arrest of some 600 Kosovar Albanian
men).
63. See Statement to the Press Following Decision on the ACTORD by Dr. Javier Solana,
Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty (Oct. 13, 1998) available at http://www.nato.int/
docu/speech/1998/s981013a.
htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2003).
64. See Agreement on the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, Oct. 16, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 24
(1999).
65. See Operation Eagle Eye - The NATO Kosovo Verification Mission, available at
http://www.afsouth.
nato.int/operations/deteagle/Eagle.htm#MISSION (last visited Jan. 2, 2003) , (referring to the
Agreement between the Chief of General Staff of the FRY and NATO Supreme Allied Commander
Europe, signed on Oct. 15, 1998, establishing air verification mission over Kosovo)
66. See Statement by President Clinton (Jan. 16, 1999), available at http://clinton6.nara.gov/
1999/01 /1999-01-16-statement-by-the-president-on-kosovo.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2003).
67. See Press Statement by Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State of the United States (Jan. 18,
1999), available at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs99/99011912.htm (last visited Jan. 2,
2003).
68. See Statement to the Press by Ambassador Kai Eide, Chairman of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe Permanent Council (Jan. 18, 1999), available at
http://www.state.gov/www/
policyremarks/1999/990118_eide racak.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2003).
69. See Press Release, Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan, Secretary General
Shocked by Alleged Massacre in Kosovo (Jan. 19, 1999) (relating the statement issued Jan. 16, 1999, by
the Spokesman for the Secretary-General) U.N. Doc. SG/SM/6864, available at http://www.un.org/
News/Press/docs/1999/19990119.sgsm6864.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2003).
70. See Statement to the Press by Dr. Javier Solana, Secretary General of the North Atlantic
Treaty (Jan. 28, 1999) available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-01 le.htm (last visited Jan. 2,
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RAMBOUILLET AND THE NEGOTIATION OF EARNED SOVEREIGNTY

Using the now credible threat of force, the United States and its allies
convened the Rambouillet peace talks in early February 1999. 71 The approach
developed by the international community during the talks was based in large part
on the approach of earned sovereignty.
As explained in the U.S. Department of State's Fact Sheet entitled
"Understanding the Rambouillet Accords," the primary elements of the Interim
Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo concerned provisions for the
creation of democratic self-government, the protection of human rights, the
establishment of security, and the convening of an international meeting at the end
of a three year period which would establish a mechanism for final settlement.72
As noted below, the nature of the final settlement would depend in large part on
the will of the people of Kosovo and compliance by the Kosovar government and
other institutions with the relevant provisions of the agreement.
The primary focus of the Rambouillet Accords was to create democratic selfgovernment in Kosovo. The Rambouillet Accords sought to promote democratic
self-government by creating a comprehensive Constitution under the authority of
which there would be the democratic election of a President and an Assembly and
the subsequent appointment of a prime minister and government. Strong local
governments would also be created. The Constitution also provided for a full
range of powers to be exercised by the central government, which included
taxation, economic regulation and development, property rights, social policy,
environmental protection, local self-government, and the power to conduct foreign
relations in specified areas. To ensure the participation of minority representatives
in the government, the Accords established a quota system for such representatives
in the Assembly and for the adequate inclusion of minority representatives in
Government positions.73
The Accords also provided for the interim retention of significant elements of
sovereignty by the FRY, including the rights to ensure the territorial integrity of
establish
the FRY, maintain a common market, operate the customs services,
74
policy.
foreign
conduct
and
defense,
for
provide
policy,
monetary
To prevent future atrocities against the Kosovar Albanians, and to protect the
Serbs from acts of retribution, the Accords included numerous provisions on the
protection of human rights. The cornerstone of the protections for human rights

2003). See also Statement by the North Atlantic Council on Kosovo (Jan. 30, 1999), available at
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-012e.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2003).
71. See Press Release, Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, Albright on NATO Final Warning
on Kosovo (Jan. 30, 1999), available at http://usembassy-australia.state.gov/hyper/WF990201/
epfl 15.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2003).
72. See generally Understanding the Rambouillet Accords, U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of Eur.
Aff. (Mar. 1, 1999), available at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/fs_990301_rambouillet.html
(last visited Jan. 2, 2003).
73. Rambouillet Accords, supranote 13, at ch. 1, art. 2 & 4.
74. Id. at ch.1, art. 1(3).

2003

EARNED SOVEREIGNTY: CONFLICT OVER

KOSOvO'S

FINAL STATUS

403

was the incorporation of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and its Protocols, directly into Kosovar law."
Additional protections included the creation of an Ombudsman office with
extensive authority to monitor the protection of minority and human rights and
fundamental freedoms throughout Kosovo. 76 The Accords also provided explicit
protection for such rights as the use of national community symbols, language,
cultural and religious association, and the right to be free from discrimination.77
The Accords provided for the complete withdrawal of all Yugoslav Army
forces and the substantial reduction of Serbian police forces in Kosovo, as well as
the transformation of the Kosovo Liberation Army into the Kosovo Protection
Corps modeled after the American National Guard. Security was to be provided
by the deployment of an extensive international force. The international force
would be responsible for providing both internal and external security.78
Importantly, the Accords expressly provided there would be no change in the
borders of Kosovo. 79
The Accords embodied the approach of earned sovereignty by providing the
Kosovar Albanians with certain sovereign rights, and excluding the exercise of
certain sovereign rights by Serbia and the FRY. For instance, under the Accords,
Kosovo would be able to exercise partial sovereignty by conducting foreign
relations in specified areas, concluding some international agreements, and
receiving direct international assistance.8 ° Moreover, there was also no bar to
Kosovo appointing international representatives for foreign countries.
In the Rambouillet Accords, the international community set the precedent for
diminishing Yugoslav sovereignty, building up Kosovar sovereignty, and accruing
certain sovereign responsibilities unto itself. The deployment of the international
security force was the most direct example of the erosion of Yugoslav sovereignty,
while the presence of three international judges on the Kosovar Supreme Court
illustrates the limit on Kosovar sovereignty occasioned by the extensive
involvement of the international community in the affairs of Kosovo.
A primary tenet of earned sovereignty, that of an opportunity to earn full
sovereignty, was codified in article one of the final chapter of the Rambouillet
Accords, which provided that:
Three years after the entry into force of this Agreement, an international meeting
shall be convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on
the basis of the will of the people, opinions of relevant authorities, each Party's
efforts
regarding the implementation of this Agreement, and the Helsinki Final
81
Act.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at ch. 1, art. 6.
Id. at ch. 6.
Id. at ch. 1, art. 7.
Rambouillet Accords, supra note 13, at ch. 7.
Id. at ch. 1, art.1(6)(a).
Id. at ch. 1, art. 1(6)(c).
Rambouillet Accords, supra note 13, at ch. 8, art. 3.
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This article served as the core of the earned sovereignty approach detailed in
the Rambouillet Accords. The three key elements were that the arrangement
provided for in the Accords was interim, that at the end of the interim period the
international community would participate in the determination of the final status
of Kosovo, and that this determination would be based in large part on the will of
the people and each party's compliance with the basic elements of the agreement.
The reference to the Helsinki Final Act is also important as it seeks to balance the
right of self-determination with the rights of sovereignty and territorial integrity.
It is useful to note here that the Rambouillet approach to earned sovereignty
did not include provisions for the phased evolution of sovereignty for Kosovo.
Rather, the Accords provided for the allocation of sovereign rights and
responsibilities among the Kosovars, the Serbs and the international community
with a set time for reassessment of that allocation with the possibility of full
sovereignty for Kosovo. This was highly similar to the approach mapped out in
the 1998 PILPG proposal. As noted in the concluding section of this paper, the
inclusion of a process for phased sovereignty, where sovereignty increases in
relation to compliance with specified benchmarks, may, in the case of Kosovo, be
the key to the successful employment of the approach of earned sovereignty.
THE NATO AIR CAMPAIGN
In response to the massive ethnic cleansing that followed the collapse of the
Rambouillet/Paris negotiations, NATO launched a strategic air campaign, striking
targets in Kosovo and Serbia proper. During the course of the air campaign, the
Yugoslav Tribunal indicted Mr. Milosevic and a number of other top officials for
orchestrating crimes against humanity in Kosovo. After seventy-eight days of
NATO bombing and an apparently increasing willingness of the NATO member
states to authorize the deployment of ground troops, Mr. Milosevic agreed to
remove Serbian military forces from Kosovo and to allow the deployment of
NATO forces and the creation of an interim administration operated by the United
Nations. The NATO victory came, however, after Serbian forces had expelled 1.5
million Kosovo Albanians, killed tens of thousands more, and destroyed most of
their homes.
To end the conflict, the NATO member states enlisted Finnish President Marti
Ahtisaari, while Russia contributed the former Russian Prime Minister Victor
Chernomyrdin, to negotiate Milosevic's withdrawal from Kosovo.
The
Agreement, accepted by the FRY in June 1999, provided for the withdrawal from
Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces, with a possibility of
negotiated return to perform tasks under the supervision of international personnel
such as de-mining and protecting patrimonial sites.
The agreement also provided for the deployment in Kosovo, under U.N.
auspices, of effective international civil and security presences. The civilian
presence would be charged with creating mechanisms to provide the people of
Kosovo with democratic self-government and substantial autonomy in an interim
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period8 2 The security presence would establish a safe environment for all people
in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons
and refugees.8 3
Although the agreement was primarily designed to codify Milosevic's
agreement to withdraw his forces from Kosovo and permit the deployment of a
NATO-led protection force, it reflected and modified some of the key elements of
earned sovereignty. While the agreement provided for the displacement of
Yugoslav and Serbian sovereignty and the necessity of creating institutions for
democratic self-government in Kosovo, it also provided for the assumption of
sovereign functions by an international civilian administrative force, and by a
NATO-led international security force. 84 In light of the devastation caused by
Serbian forces and the displacement of nearly the entire Kosovar population, the
insertion of civilian and security forces with the responsibility to assume sovereign
functions was in fact more practical than the immediate transfer of those functions
to non-existent Kosovar institutions.
During the transition period between the withdrawal of the Serbian forces and
the full deployment of the NATO-led peacekeeping force, a number of Serbian
residents of Kosovo fled to Serbia. While some fled of their own accord, others
had been targeted for revenge attacks by some elements of the Kosovar Albanian
population. Those that stayed were subject to varying degrees of harassment by
armed Kosovar Albanians until the NATO-led forces were able to provide
adequate protection. While Serbian residents in Kosovo currently live within a
relatively secure environment, very few of the Serbian refugees who left Kosovo
have returned.
Also during the transition period, Serbian paramilitary forces retained control
of the northern section of the town of Mitrovica which straddles the Ibar River.
The town, which is a major access route to Serbia, is now effectively divided into
the northern Serb township and the southern Albanian township. All political
efforts to reintegrate the town have failed, and the French peacekeepers stationed
there have been unwilling to take effective action to provide security for minority
individuals wishing to return to their homes. Those who advocate the partition of
Kosovo talk of the "Mitrovica line," with the northern township and the territory
north of the Ibar River becoming part of Serbia in exchange for the independence
of Kosovo.
UN RESOLUTION 1244: SWAPPING SERBIAN SOVEREIGNTY FOR UN SOVEREIGNTY

To formalize the agreement between Milosevic and the international
community to end the conflict and withdraw Serbian forces from Kosovo, the U.N.
Security Council adopted resolution 1244. Resolution 1244 both established the
mandate for the NATO deployment and authorized the United Nations'

82. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 18, at Annex 2, para. 5.
83. Id. at Annex 2, para. 4.
84. Id. at Annex 2, para. 5.
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administration of Kosovo for an interim period. 85 The Agreement further codified
a number of principles which were to guide the allocation of sovereignty among
the FRY, Kosovo and the international community and sanctioned the intent of the
international community to undertake a process for resolving the final status of
Kosovo.
The substance of Resolution 1244 focused on: 1) displacing FRY sovereignty
from Kosovo 86 ; 2) replacing it with interim U.N. and NATO sovereign
responsibilities 87; 3) establishing substantial autonomy and democratic selfgovernance8s; 4) "facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's
future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords," 8 9 and 5) preparing in
the final stage to oversee "the transfer of authority from Kosovo's provisional
institutions to institutions established under a political settlement." 90
The United Nations substantially limited the sovereign authority of the FRY
and completely excluded the sovereign authority of Serbia over Kosovo by
requiring the FRY to withdraw all military, police and paramilitary personnel from
Kosovo, 9' and by making no reference to any form of Serbian sovereign rights in
Kosovo. In instances where the Security Council referenced the relationship
between the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY and Kosovo, it did so
only in the context of the interim period prior to a resolution of the final status of
Kosovo, and never in perpetuity.92
The Security Council then authorized an international security presence, led
by NATO, to replace FRY security forces. The international force was authorized
to prevent the return of FRY forces, establishing conditions for a safe and secure
environment for the people of Kosovo and the institutions operating there, monitor
and secure the Kosovar border, and
ensure public safety in the interim - all crucial
93
elements of a sovereign presence.
The international civil presence in Kosovo, which would take the form of an
SRSG and accompanying staff, was authorized to provide an interim civil
administration for Kosovo. 94 The Security Council then made it clear, however,
85. In early July, NATO deployed its forces and within the next week the U.N. appointed Bernard
Kouchner to head the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Letter from Kofi Annan,
Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Security Council (July 6, 1999), U.N. Doe. S/1999/748,
availableat http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/letters/1999/sglet.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2003).
86. S.C. Res. 1244, supranote 18, at paras. 3, 4, 9.
87. Id. at para. 5-11, 17-19.
88. Id. at para. I I(a).
89. Id. at para. I I(e).
90. Id. at, para- 1l(f).
91. Id. at para. 3.
92. Resolution 1244 did provide for the possible return of some sovereign authority by FRY
forces by including the Ahtisaari Agreement in Annex 2, which, as noted above, provided that after a
period of time an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel would be permitted to return and
would operate under the supervision of international forces to mark and clear minefields; maintain a
presence at Serb patrimonial sites; and maintain a presence at key border crossings. Id. at Annex 2,
para 6.
93. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 18, at para. 9.
94. The mandate of the U.N. administration included the authority to perform basic civilian
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that the U.N. administration was only an interim entity and that pending settlement
of the final status of Kosovo, its primary task was to promote the establishment of
substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, based on the Ahtisaari
Agreement and the Rambouillet Accords. 95 To accomplish this objective the U.N.
civil administration was charged with "organizing and overseeing the development
of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government
pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections. ' 6
As discussed below, a key element in this process was the adoption by the
U.N. administration of a Constitutional Framework for Provisional SelfGovernment. The Security Council also made it clear in its reaffirmation and
restatement of the Ahtisaari Agreement that the "negotiations between the parties
for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic selfgoverning institutions. 97 Once the Kosovar institutions were created, the U.N.
administration was to transfer to these institutions its administrative
responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of these
provisional institutions as well as other peace-building activities.98
Most importantly, the Security Council also charged the interim U.N.
administration with the obligation to facilitate "a political process designed to
determine Kosovo's future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords." 99
The U.N. administration was then to oversee the "transfer of authority from
Kosovo's provisional institutions to institutions established under a political
settlement."'1° While the Security Council did not provide an express timetable for
resolving the question of the final status of Kosovo, it did indicate this process
should be governed by the Rambouillet accords, which set a three-year time-frame.
Resolution 1244 significantly, and likely irreversibly, altered sovereign
control over Kosovo. By displacing Yugoslav sovereign control and replacing it
with an interim U.N. administration mandated to build Kosovar institutions
capable of providing for democratic self-government, it created a situation where
the chances of Kosovo returning to Yugoslav or Serbian sovereign control are
quite slim.
Resolution 1244 essentially follows the basic themes of earned sovereignty
articulated in the 1998 proposal and the Rambouillet Accords in that it displaces
Yugoslav sovereignty, creates mechanisms for establishing democratic selfgovernment and the protection of minority rights, and mandates the resolution of
administrative functions, support the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic
reconstruction; supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian organizations, humanitarian
and disaster relief aid; maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and
meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo; protect and
promote human rights; and assure the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons
to their homes in Kosovo. Id. at para. 11.
95. Id. atpara. 10.
96. Jd. at Annex 1, para. I I(c).
97. Id. at Annex 2, para. 8.
98. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 18, at para. 11 (d).
99. Id. at para. 1 (e).
100. Id. at para. I1(0.
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Kosovo's final status. Resolution 1244, however, creates a substantial addition to
the approach by providing for the exercise of sovereign functions by the United
Nations.101 Whereas the original articulation of the approach and its design in the
Rambouillet Accords provided for a transfer of sovereignty to the people of
Kosovo and then an evaluation of the final status of Kosovo based in part on its
compliance with the specific provisions of the Accords, Resolution 1244 provides
for the United Nations to first assume control of sovereign functions, negotiate a
constitutional framework and then begin the transfer of sovereign functions to
Kosovar institutions. Simultaneously, the
United Nations is mandated to pursue a
10 2
resolution of the final status of Kosovo.
Importantly, Resolution 1244 in no way intends for the deployment of a U.N.
administration to supplant the process for a settlement of Kosovo's final status.
Rather, Resolution 1244 is very clear in its mandate to the U.N. Administration to
facilitate the resolution of Kosovo's final status, to phase in Kosovar control of the
mechanisms for self-government, and then to assist in the transfer
of sovereign
01 3
authorities to the new institutions created in any final settlement.
While Resolution 1244 lacks an express provision for the ability of the people
of Kosovo to earn increasing degrees of sovereignty based on their demonstrated
respect for certain principles, its constant reference to the Rambouillet Accords
provides a strong basis for the inference of such a principle. 1°4 Notably,
Resolution 1244 does not provide for a continued international presence, civilian
or military after the transfer of authority.
Despite the clarity of Resolution 1244 regarding the interim transfer of
sovereignty to the U.N. administration and the legitimacy of a process for
determining the final status, some European states have argued that Resolution
1244, by its preambular reference to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
FRY, precludes an eventual independent final status for Kosovo. This argument,
however, does not possess a sufficient legal foundation.
In the preamble to Resolution 1244 the Security Council cited the ritual
affirmation of the commitment of all member states to the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the FRY and the other States of the region, as set out in the
Helsinki Final Act and Annex 2 of the Resolution. 0 5 Crucially, the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the FRY was conditioned by the Helsinki Final act and
Annex 2 of the Security Council Resolution. The Helsinki Final act provides for
the equal recognition of a state's right to sovereignty and territorial integrity, and
of a minority peoples' right to self-determination. Annex 2 expressly places the
respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY within the context of
the "interim political framework agreement providing for substantial selfgovernment for Kosovo,"'' 0 6 and also noted the necessity of taking full account of
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 18, at paras. 5, 6, 9-11.
Id. at para. 11.
Id.
Id. at para. 11, Annex 1, Annex 2, para. 8.
S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 18, at pmbl.
Id. at Annex 2, para. 8 (emphasis added).
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The Rambouillet Accords, also in the preamble, "recalled" the commitment of
the international community to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
FRY. 108 The Accords, as noted above, then went on to provide for the near total
exclusion of FRY sovereignty over Kosovo and for the creation of a mechanism to
determine final status in three years. The preamble of Resolution 1244 therefore
cannot reasonably be perceived to prevent the international community from
moving forward with a process for resolving Kosovo's final status.
THE EROSION OF SERBIAN SOVEREIGNTY

Pursuant to Resolution 1244, the NATO-led security force displaced all of the
Yugoslav and Serbian forces operating in Kosovo, and assumed all sovereign
functions previously performed by those forces. Moreover, the security force has
refused to permit the return of Serbian forces to guard patrimonial
sites and be
09
present on the border as envisioned in the Ahtisaari Agreement. 1
Acting under the authority of Resolution 1244, UNMIK has assumed all of
the sovereign functions in Kosovo. In fact, the first act of UNMIK was to adopt
Regulation One, which provides, "All legislative and executive authority with
respect to Kosovo, including the administration of the judiciary, is vested in
JNMIK and is exercised by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
(SRSG)." '"0 UNMIK also assumed authority over all financial assets in Kosovo,
by authorizing itself to "administer movable or immovable property, including
monies, bank accounts, and other property of, or registered in the name of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or the Republic of Serbia or any of its organs,
which is in the territory of Kosovo."' n
Acting under this and subsequent regulations, UNMIK levies and collects
taxes; operates its own civil service; issues Kosovo specific stamps through its own
postal system; controls borders; collects customs duties to fund Kosovo's
budget;1 2 enters into agreements with foreign governments; and grants consent for
the establishment of "Liaison offices" representing the governments of foreign
states. 3'
UNMIK has also operated to remove or prohibit any Yugoslav or Serbian
107. Id.
108. Rambouillet Accords, supra note 13, at pmbl.
109. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 18, at Annex 2, para 6.
110. See Regulation No. 1999/1, U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, § 1, para. 1, U.N.
Doc. UNMIK/REG/ 1999/1 (1999) available at http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/
regl.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2003).
111. Id. at§6.
112. See Regulation No. 1999/3, U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, § 1, U.N. Doc.
UNMIK/REG/1999/3 (1999) available at http://www.un.org/peacelkosovo/pages/regulations/reg3.html
(last visited Jan. 3, 2003).
113. See Regulation No. 2000/42, U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doc.
UNMIK/REGi2000/42 (2000) available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2000/reg42-00.htrn
(last visited Jan. 3, 2003).
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sovereign functional control by adopting the Euro to replace the Dinar as the
currency, refusing to sanction or organize participation in Yugoslav presidential
and parliamentary elections, issuing OSCE developed identity cards which can
also be used in lieu of passports, replacing the use of Yugoslav or Republic of
Serbia seals and insignia with U.N. symbols and the word "Kosovo," and
removing Yugoslav and Serbian flags from former state property.
In keeping with its obligation to build institutions for democratic selfgovernment, while also reducing the likelihood of moving too quickly to establish
an independent Kosovo, UNMIK first created government and administrative
institutions at the local level. UNMIK thus initially provided an international
Municipal Administrator for each of Kosovo's thirty municipalities. At the start of
the international mission these local administrators formed consultative municipal
councils staffed by local appointees and administrative boards responsible for
managing local services.
At first, UNMIK exercised exclusive executive authority at the Kosovo-wide
level. After the first six months, however, on January 31, 2000, UNMIK created
the Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS) which devised three political
structures at the provincial level responsible for incorporating Kosovo's citizens
into the decision-making process. The first of these bodies was an executive board
called the Interim Administrative Council (IAC) which would come to act as the
highest decision making body in Kosovo. The SRSG is the chief executive while
eight members, four local and four UNMIK international officials, make up the
council. 1 4 Second, JIAS also established twenty administrative departments, now
referred to as ministries, ranging from justice to civil security, that were co-run by
UNMIK officials and local representatives. Third, it created a new municipal level
governmental system, with municipal elections in October 28, 2000 that5 offered
for the first time defined powers and responsibilities for elected officials.l"
The municipal elections played a crucial role in transforming the former
paramilitary organizations into legitimate political parties and providing them a
political avenue to express their views, thereby reducing the overall level of
violence in Kosovo. While the local municipal political structures were slow to
implement legislation and were often charged with petty corruption, the overall

114. The four local seats were occupied by Ibrahim Rugova, President of the Democratic League of
Kosovo (LDK); Hashim Thaii, President of the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK); Rexhep Qosja,
President of the United Democratic Movement (LBD); and Bishop Artemije leader of the Serbian
National Council (SNC).
115. These powers include: providing basic local conditions for sustainable economic development;
licensing of building and other development; the implementation of building regulations and building
control standards; public services including fire and emergency services; management of municipal
property; pre-primary, primary and secondary education; social services and housing; licensing of
services and facilities including: entertainment, food, markets, street vendors, local public transport and
taxis, hunting and fishing and restaurants and hotels ; naming and renaming of roads, streets and other
public places; and such other activities as are necessary for the proper administration of the
municipality and which are not assigned elsewhere by law. See Regulation No. 2000/45, U.N. Interim
Administration Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2000/45 (2000), available at
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2000/reg45-00.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2003).
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consensus among international observers is the municipal governments are
functioning as basic political entities and are capable of assuming increasing
degrees of authority and are likely to play a constructive role in protecting human
rights and promoting a normalization of life in Kosovo.
FINDING SPACE FOR KOsOVO SOVEREIGNTY: GOLDSTONE PROPOSAL I

In light of the progress made in displacing Yugoslav and Serb sovereignty in
Kosovo and initiating the creation of institutions for democratic self-government,
the Goldstone Commission, formally known as the Independent International
Commission on Kosovo,' 1 6 argued that it would soon be time to resolve the final
status of Kosovo and transfer full authority to Kosovar institutions. The Goldstone
Commission thus crafted and announced a proposal for earned sovereignty which
it termed conditional independence.
The core elements of the proposal reflected the 1998 PILPG proposal with
necessary modification to account for the changed circumstances brought about by
the NATO air campaign, Resolution 1244 and the establishment of UNMIK. The
core elements thus included the prompt holding of a referendum to ascertain the
will of the people,' 17 the subsequent initiation of U.N.-sponsored talks between the
Kosovar Albanians and the Kosovar Serbs, the development of mechanisms to
protect minority and human rights, arrangements for the continued presence of
international security forces, and the phased transfer of effective administration
from the United Nations to the legitimate national and municipal authorities."'
The Goldstone Proposal provided that a supervisory international presence would
continue to operate in Kosovo even after independence was established." 9
The Goldstone Commission was clear that its proposal would "effectively end
FRY sovereignty over Kosovo, [but] it would not immediately confer the full
international legal personality of statehood." 20 Under the proposal, Kosovo would
"gradually acquire the rights of a state as it demonstrates that its people can live in
peace with each other and with the neighboring states in the region."' 12 1 As Kosovo
attained increasing levels of sovereignty in response to its protection of minority
rights and promotion of stability, the international community could reduce its
military presence. At such time as Kosovo "established conditions of internal and
external peace" it would be able to earn recognition of its independence from the

116. The Goldstone Commission, was created at the initiative of the Swedish government and
funded by that government as well as the Government of Canada, and numerous foundations. Members
of the Commission included key foreign policy makers and commentators from Japan, the United
States, Russia, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, Germany and the Czech Republic. The
Commission was chaired by Judge Richard Goldstone of the South African Constitutional Court, and
Co-Chaired by Carl Tham of Sweden. The report was presented to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations on October 23, 20000.
117. THE Kosovo REPORT, supranote 20, at 271.
118. Id. at 272-3.
119. THE Kosovo REPORT, supranote 20, at 274.
120. Id.
121. Id.

DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

member states of the international community.

VOL. 31:3

22

The Goldstone Proposal was a crucial development in the evolution of the
approach of earned sovereignty in two important ways. First, it provided a rational
and lucid road map for the international community to establish a secure peace and
consequently reduce its presence in Kosovo, at a time when the United Nations had
effectively displaced FRY sovereignty over Kosovo, but had begun to settle into
the process of establishing a costly and perpetual U.N. protectorate over Kosovo.
Second, the Goldstone Proposal further evolved the notion of earned sovereignty
by proposing the element of phased sovereignty for Kosovo in proportion
23 to the
ability of the Kosovo institutions to provide internal and external security.'
One of the flaws of the Goldstone proposal was that it did not seek the
express renunciation of designs for a Greater Albania or a Greater Kosovo, or any
commitments not to undertake territorial association with neighboring states as
called for in the 1998 PILPG report.
In response to the Goldstone proposal, and efforts by influential former policy
makers, the United States and the United Nations renewed their efforts to craft
province-wide institutions capable of absorbing the transfer of sovereign authority
from the United Nations to the people of Kosovo. These efforts met stiff
resistance by the European Union and some European states who had come to
believe that an independent Kosovo might further destabilize the region and
promote increased separatism in Europe.
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR PROVISIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT

While Resolution 1244 expressly called for the creation of a Constitutional
Framework for the governance of Kosovo, it was not until May 15, 2001 that
UNMIK officially promulgated the Constitutional Framework for Provisional SelfGovernment. Little progress towards a constitution was made during the first two
years of UNMIK's operation, as many European states objected to the devolution
of authority from UNMIK to the Kosovar people that would accompany the
promulgation of a constitution. In large part, key European states returned to the
approach of "the stability through accommodation" and sought to diminish the
elements of earned sovereignty woven into the Rambouillet Accords and UNSC
1244.
The Constitutional Framework was eventually drafted and promulgated as a
result of strong American pressure to fulfill the international obligations set forth
in 1244 and by the commitment of a highly skilled Department of State lawyer
who was able to craft a constitution which provided for the democratic
representation of all legitimate parties in Kosovo, while providing mechanisms for
building up the capacity24 of Kosovar institutions, and thus easing any future
transition to final status.'

122. Id.
123. THE Kosovo REPORT, supra note 20, at 274.
124. See generally RegulationNo. 2001/9, supra note 22.
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The Constitutional Framework set forth three sets of guiding principles for the
future governance of Kosovo. First, it required the domestic institutions of Kosovo
to "exercise their authorities consistent with the provisions of JNSCR 1244 (1999)
and the terms set forth in this Constitutional Framework."'125 Second, it required
those institutions to "promote and fully respect the rule of law, human rights and
freedoms, democratic principles and reconciliation."' 126 To ensure the protection of
human rights throughout Kosovo, the Constitutional Framework required that the
provisions on rights and freedoms set forth in a number of international human
rights treaties and instruments would be directly applicable in Kosovo as part of
the Constitutional Framework. 127 Finally, the Constitutional Framework provided
that the Kosovar institutions must "promote and respect the principle of the
division of powers between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary.' 28
These principles represent an expansion of the core themes of earned sovereignty
relating to the protection of human rights and the basic principles of democratic
governance.
The Constitutional Framework then enumerated the responsibilities of the
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government. These include economic policy, trade,
administrative and operational customs, education, health, environmental policy,
infrastructure, agriculture and forestry, tourism, and "good governance, human
rights and equal opportunity." The institutions also possess specific duties in the
fields of local administration, judicial affairs, mass media, and emergency
preparedness. The Constitutional Framework further stipulated that any external
relations conducted by the provisional institutions must be conducted with the
coordination of the SRSG,
and that the powers must be exercised in alignment with
29
international standards. 1
With respect to the allocation of authority, the Constitutional Framework set
the foundation for the implementation of a process of phased sovereignty as
suggested in the Goldstone report by creating democratic institutions for the
governance of Kosovo, while initially retaining most of the authority for decisionmaking within the purview of the SRSG. For instance, while the new Kosovar
Parliament possessed the authority to establish economic and fiscal policy, and to
regulate most areas of state activity, the SRSG retained authorities such as
approval of the budget, operation of the customs service, the setting of monetary
policy, the appointment and dismissal of judges, and conduct of the international

125. Id. at ch. 2, para. a.
126. Id. at ch. 2, para. b.
127. These treaties included the Universal Declaration on Human Rights; the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols; the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Protocols thereto; the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; the European Charter for Regional or
Minority Languages; and the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities. Id. at ch. 3, para. 2.
128. Id. at ch. 2, para. c.
129. United Nations: Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, ConstitutionalFrameworkfor
ProvisionalSelf-Government, UNMIK/REG/2001/9 (May 15, 2001), Chapter 5.
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affairs of Kosovo.130 The Constitutional Framework was clear that, consistent with
Resolution 1244, the powers retained by the SRSG should be increasingly turned
people of Kosovo as the new institutions mature and become
over to the
3
effective.) 1
The Constitutional Framework also set up a unique dual key system of initial
and primary responsibility that could be used to effectively implement a system of
earned sovereignty. For instance, while the Kosovar institutions possessed the
right to make decisions regarding the appointment of judges and prosecutors, the
SRSG retained the final authority regarding the appointment, removal from office
and disciplining of judges and prosecutors. While the Kosovar institutions could
ensure coordination on matters pertaining to the judicial system and the
correctional service, the SRSG exercised authority over law enforcement
institutions and the correctional service, both of which included and were
supported by local staff.132 Similarly, as noted above, the Kosovar institutions
could engage in international and external cooperation, including the reaching and
finalizing
of agreements so long as they coordinated such activities with the
33
SRSG. 1
With the significant overlap of sovereignty, the system created by the
Constitutional Framework was well designed to transfer increasing amounts of
sovereign authority in an orderly and effective manner to the Kosovar institutions
as they demonstrated their capability to govern successfully and to protect minority
and human rights.
The Constitutional Framework also very clearly carried through the key
element of earned sovereignty as reflected in the Rambouillet Accords, that of a
final status determined along the lines expressed by the will of the people.
Specifically, the Constitutional Framework provided that the provisional
institutions of self-government should conduct their work with "a view to
facilitating the determination of Kosovo's future status through a process at an
take
appropriate future stage which shall, in accordance with UNSCR 1244(1999),
' 34
full account of all relevant factors including the will of the people."'
Initially, the work of the Kosovar Parliament was largely preoccupied with
establishing itself, as opposed to UNMIK, as the responsible body for exercising
Kosovo's sovereignty. One of the first acts of the parliament was to pass a
resolution in the foreign policy and security sphere, a responsibility retained
exclusively for the SRSG under the Constitutional Framework. In May 2002,
Parliament voted to reject the Serbia/Macedonia border demarcation agreement of
February 2001 between Serbia and Macedonia. The agreement was opposed by
Kosovars and was, at first, condemned by UNMIK for failing to consult the
international administration in an agreement that altered Kosovo's boundaries.

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

See Regulation 2001/9, supra note 22, at ch. 8.
Id. at chs. 6, 14.2
See Regulation 2001/9, supra note 22, at ch. 9.4.
Id. at ch. 5.6.
Id. at pmbl.
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However, a year later the United Nations decided to support the agreement over
the objections of Kosovars, who claimed that over 2500 hectares of land were
being turned over by Serbia, which no longer exercised any de facto sovereignty
over Kosovo, to Macedonia.
The Parliament's resolution to preserve and protect Kosovo's territorial
integrity was declared null and void by the SRSG, Michael Steiner, who criticized
the action as a setback that deliberately antagonized the international
community.135 The Parliament's actions and Steiner's response reflected the
growing competition between the United Nations and the new Kosovo political
institutions over control of sovereign functions and authority for Kosovo.
POLITICAL CHANGES IN SERBIA AND LULL IN ACCUMULATION OF Kosovo
SOVEREIGNTY

Political changes in Serbia, such as the removal of President Milosevic and
his transfer to the Yugoslav Tribunal to stand trial for crimes against humanity in
Kosovo and genocide in Bosnia, as well as the continued tension between Kosovar
Albanians and Kosovar Serbs led the SRSG to retain substantial powers and to
significantly slow any further devolution, despite the requirements of the
Constitutional Framework.
With the collapse of Milosevic's authoritarian, nationalist rule and its
replacement by a more Western-focused government, the international community
became increasingly concerned that efforts to increase Kosovar self-governance
could destabilize Serbia. The election of a pro-independence government in
Montenegro also dampened the willingness of the international community to
support further devolution of sovereign authority and functions to Kosovo.
Moreover, although the Serbian public became increasingly aware of the atrocities
committed by Serbian forces against Kosovar civilians, there was no abatement in
the nationalist pull to retain Kosovo within Serbia. Growing political violence in
southern Serbia and Macedonia reinforced the Serbian desire to retain Kosovo and
the fear of the international community that an increasingly sovereign Kosovo
could lead to greater instability in the Balkan region. In particular, the European
Union objected to any efforts that might be deemed as leading toward a resolution
36
of final status for fear of undermining the democratic transformation in Serbia. 1
As a result of these developments there was a lull in the accumulation of Kosovar
sovereignty. The lull became all the more pronounced, as the second Kosovo
135. See Administrator Rules Kosovo Resolution "Null and Void," DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR,
May 23, 2002.
136. The primary policy objective of the European Union in 2002 has been to maintain the
existence of the Yugoslav federation in the face of Montenegrin desire for independence and growing
indifference on the part of Serbians toward the future of Yugoslavia. Believing that if Montenegro were
to depart Yugoslavia then Kosovo's exit would be guaranteed, the European Union secured an
agreement that preserved Yugoslavia in a very loose confederacy for another three years before
referendums, if so desired, on independence could be launched. Maintaining the stability through
accommodation, in preserving Yugoslavia and in avoiding determination of Kosovo's future political
status is the core of the European Union's Balkan policy.
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Commission reported, explaining that once Kosovo's Parliament and Prime
Minister were chosen, "the stage will be set for a growing conflict over the
SRSG's reserved powers, and more generally between a local political elite,
ratified by their electorate, bent on securing ever greater powers of selfgovernment and an international administration, bent on maintaining its
prerogatives."'' 37 The Goldstone Commission further noted that some international
authorities treated Kosovar capacity for self-rule with "imperial condescension"
capacity of the
and that a "pervasive distrust" of the political and administrative 138
local population "appears to underlie the constitutional provisions."
GOLDSTONE PROPOSAL II

In September 2001, in response to the stalled efforts to devolve sovereignty to
Kosovar institutions, and in light of increasing fears that maintaining the stability
through accommodation would lead to an unnecessarily prolonged commitment of
U.N. resources and NATO troops, and that the stability through accommodation
was creating substantial instability in the region, the Goldstone Commission
released a more detailed proposal for conditional independence.1 39 The second
Goldstone proposal (Goldstone II) maintained the elements of the first proposal,
but provided a more specific road map for the devolution of powers.
In rejecting the stability through accommodation model of an indefinite
protectorate, the Goldstone proposal cited several reasons that this protectorate
was actually increasing and prolonging instability. The Commission argued that
the indefinite protectorate implied by the Constitutional Framework would not, as
some argued, allay tension in the region by ruling out independence. Rather, the
protectorate would increase tension between the people of Kosovo and the
international administration of the SRSG. Moreover, by maintaining the undefined
nature of Kosovo's status, the international protectorate model would encourage
both nationalist hopes for a greater Albania, or for a greater Yugoslavia, and was in
fact already serving as a catalysts for ethnic violence, both within and outside
Kosovo. 140
Goldstone II argued for the rapid devolution of important powers from the
SRSG to the Kosovar government relating to such matters as customs, the
judiciary, the police, public and state owned property, transportation, civil aviation,
housing and property matters, and regulation of municipal boundaries. The
Goldstone commission also argued that the undefined residual powers of Chapter
12 of the Constitutional Framework should also be exercised by the Kosovar
government. 141

137. THE FOLLOW-UP OF THE Kosovo REPORT, supra note 1, at 21.
138. Idat20-21.
139. See generally THE FOLLOW-UP OF THE Kosovo REPORT, supra note 1.
140. Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Follow Up: Why Conditional
Independence? (September 2001), "The Situation in Kosovo and the Illusion of Self-Rule," "Revisiting
Conditional Independence."
141. Id. at25
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Coupled with the devolution of powers, Goldstone II proposed that the
relevant Kosovar institutions be permitted to negotiate with the NATO-led Kosovo
Force (KFOR) international security presence in Kosovo, and that they be
empowered to enter into negotiations with international agencies and foreign
governments, and presumably be entitled to establish some form of foreign
mission. In particular, the Goldstone commission thought it necessary for the
Kosovar government to be able to enter into relations with neighboring states.
Absent such authority, it is feared the Kosovar authorities would have little or no
incentive to behave in a responsible manner toward its neighboring states.142
In arguing for the rapid devolution of authority, the Goldstone Commission
noted that over seventy
percent of revenues used by the Kosovo government were
43
internally generated.
Goldstone II proposed that in exchange for the assumption of these powers,
the Kosovar government would undertake a variety of commitments which were a
mix of general responsibilities of a state under international law, and
responsibilities which would be considered limits on the sovereignty of an
internationally recognized state.' 44
The first commitment reflected a return to the original condition contained in
the 1998 PILPG report and provided that Kosovo must explicitly renounce any
claim to a Greater Albania or a Greater Kosovo. While the Commission was
sympathetic to the legitimate need to support Albanian rights in other states, it
believed it was necessary for the Kosovar government to explicitly declare a
commitment to a policy of non-interference
in neighboring states, and to the
45
respect for their territorial integrity.
The second commitment reflected a return to a key theme of the Rambouillet
Accords, which was the requirement for a constitutional guarantee of human rights
for all the citizens of Kosovo. In the same vein as the Rambouillet Accords,
Goldstone II seemed to call for guaranteed participation in all the institutions of
Kosovo, and in particular the judiciary, police and elected offices. Goldstone II
further suggested that minority populations should be entitled to "internationally
protected rights to government services and education in their own language."
Goldstone II was careful to note that mere constitutional protections and some
form of international involvement in the protection of rights were in and of
themselves insufficient and that in addition the Kosovar institutions would be
expected to make "real efforts" to cooperate with the minority populations in
Kosovo and to foster inter-ethnic dialogue and promote reconciliation. The
measure of success would be the extent to which minorities continued to remain in
Kosovo, and whether conditions1 46were created which prompted Serb refugees to
return to their homes in Kosovo.

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
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THE FOLLOW-UP OF THE Kosovo REPORT, supra note 1, at 25.
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Id. at 28.
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The third commitment concerned the standard international legal obligation of
states to renounce the use of violence. Here the Goldstone Commission felt it
necessary that the Kosovo political leadership expressly renounce violence to settle
internal and external disputes and that it take active steps to build a culture of nonviolence. Goldstone II also called for the express distancing of the Kosovar
political leadership from liberation groups in neighboring Serbia and
Macedonia. 147
The fourth commitment involved the obligation/right to actively engage in
for regional
efforts at regional cooperation and participate in mechanisms
48
governance and support the work of regional institutions.
To ensure compliance with these commitments, Goldstone II called for
continued international supervision, with the final authority for protecting borders
49
and minorities being placed in the hands of the international presence.'
Goldstone II seemed to argue that the Kosovar government should hold the initial
responsibility to fulfill the commitments, and that in areas such as the protection of
minority rights and the respect for the territorial integrity of neighboring states the
international community would create back-up mechanisms to be employed only
when the Kosovo government is unwilling or unable to meet these commitments.
Goldstone II thus called for the near immediate reduction of the powers of the
international community, in the form of the SRSG or some other appropriate form,
to include only protection of minorities, guarantee of human rights and the
guarantee of the integrity of borders, with these powers exercised only when the
locally elected officials failed to meet their obligations. S5
The presence of the international community would be phased out and the
sovereign authority of Kosovo would continue to grow as the government and
people of Kosovo proved themselves capable of meeting the above commitments.
Over time, as Kosovo fully met these commitments, it would become international
recognized by the member states of the international community.' 5 '
The Goldstone Commission sought to rebut the three main arguments
presented against earned sovereignty. First the Commission addressed the concern
that the nascent democracy in Serbia would be jeopardized by reopened
discussions about Kosovo's future, which could fuel extremist sympathy. Here,
the Commission argued that, in fact, postponing the resolution would actually
in the future, once support for the new
increase the difficulty of resolving the issue
152
democratic administration had subsided.
Next, the Commission reviewed the concern that permitting conditional
independence for Kosovo could set off demands for the same in Montenegro and
other regions. The Commission argued that this concern was overstated as the
147. Id. at 27.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. THE FOLLOW-UP OF THE Kosovo REPORT, supra note 1, at 27.
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specific conditions for Kosovo's earned sovereignty ruled out spillover effects,
conditional independence would eliminate many of the current uncertainties in the
region, none of the other sub-sate entities possessed the same legal argument for
independence, which was a history of systematic human rights abuses, and earned
sovereignty was not any more likely than the other proposed scenarios to generate
domino effects.' 53
Finally, the Commission addressed the concern that the mere discussion of
Kosovo's final status could undermine unanimity within the UN Security Council.
The Goldstone Commission argued that this too was an overstated concern as
Russia was unlikely to154block a resolution if such a resolution had already been
agreed to in the region.
ICG PROPOSAL
Following the initial articulation and subsequent development of the concept
of earned sovereignty by the Public International Law & Policy Group and the
Goldstone Commission, the ICG sought to lend additional support for the concept
and to further refine its application to Kosovo.
The ICG proposal, which was firmly based in the PILPG and Goldstone
precedent, extended the concept and argued for a renewed international trusteeship.
The ICG proposal also separated out the question of compliance with conditions
from that of Kosovo's final status. The ICG argued that Kosovo's final status
should be settled in parallel with the running of the international trusteeship of
Kosovo, and at such point as the international presence was no longer needed
Kosovar institutions would be able to assume
relevant sovereign powers and then
55
step into whatever status Kosovo possessed.
The ICG proposal argued that a resolution of Kosovo's final status was
crucial to stability in the region. ICG believed that the uncertain process for
determining a final status was a significant obstacle to the normalization of
relations between the Albanian and Serb communities, and that it prolonged the
view of each group that the other was a threat. The proposal further argued that
continued uncertainty threatened the political investment of the international
community56 in Kosovo, and caused the unnecessary extension of the peacekeeping
presence.
Like the Goldstone proposal, the ICG proposal then sought to refute the three
main arguments that the international community often made for postponing the
discussion of Kosovo's final status. First, lCG argued that the initiation of final
status talks would not setback Serbia's transition, as it was in fact the lack of
definition of Kosovo's final status which was beginning to undermine Serbian
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See International Crisis Group, A Kosovo Roadmap (I): Addressing FinalStatus,
"ICG Balkans Report N0 124" (2002), pp. ii-iv, available at www.crisisweb.org/projects/balkans/
kosovo/reports/A400561_01032002.pdf (last
visited Oct. 20, 2002).
156. ICG, supra ii..
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stability and slow the transition to a non-nationalist state. Second, ICG argued that
a determination of Kosovo's final status would not jeopardize regional stability by
encouraging other separatist movements in the region as Kosovo's case was
dissimilar to other regional groups, given its history as a defined state within the
former Yugoslavia and its status as a UN protectorate. Finally, the ICG observed
that while some argued international consensus on Kosovo was not strong enough
to withstand reopening
the issue, in fact, "the international consensus has become a
157
recipe for inertia."'
With respect to the substance of conditional independence, the ICG proposal
built on the earlier earned sovereignty proposals by separating out questions of
internal and external sovereignty. While ICG adopted the notion of earned
sovereignty for the devolution of powers from an international trusteeship to
domestic Kosovar institutions, it argued that the final status of Kosovo, be it
independence or some association with Serbia, should be settled immediately in
political negotiations, and that status should be implemented by an international
trustee until such time as the Kosovar institutions were capable of displacing the
trustee.' 58
This addition was a critical development as it clarified the need to resolve the
fact that there was no possibility for Kosovo to remain part of Serbia and to begin
the process of creating an independent Kosovo, so that when Kosovar institutions
were capable of assuming full sovereign powers, they were not immediately faced
with having to then establish Kosovo as an independent entity.
Recognizing the necessity to respond to the will of the people of Kosovo, the
ICG proposal argued that Kosovo and Serbia should negotiate arrangements for
Kosovo's final status under the auspices of the United Nations and G8, but that if
these negotiations are unsuccessful, the international community "should discharge
the responsibility it assumed in 1999 by imposing a solution based on the
democratic will of the people of Kosovo." 59 The will of the people would be
assessed via a referendum.
The ICG believed that the success of the negotiations would be enhanced if
Kosovar and Serb institutions immediately undertook a dialogue on practical issues
of mutual concern and on confidence building measures.'6
While the PILPG and Goldstone proposals focused substantial attention on
the conditions for earned sovereignty, the ICG proposal was less adamant about
the nature of the conditions, in part because it believed they should be negotiated
by the parties concerned, and rather focused on the process of phasing sovereignty,
while simultaneously resolving the question of final status. Moreover, the focus of
the ICG report was more on the actual ability of Kosovar institutions to effectively
govern in a fair and effective manner, and less on its express commitment to
certain principles.
157.
158.
159.
160.

ICG, supra ii.
Id. at p. iv.
Id. at p. iii.
International Crisis Group, supra note 149, at. ii-3.
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As such, the ICG proposal argued that earned sovereignty would likely
include the requirement of the full protection of minority rights, and the
renunciation of intentions for a Greater6 Albania or Greater Kosovo, although the
ICG believed this fear to be overstated.1 1
With respect to the nature of the proposed trusteeship, the ICG argued it
should be less intrusive than the current SRSG arrangement, with the trustee
simply exercising veto powers either at large or in specifically defined areas. Like
the 1998 PILPG and Goldstone II proposals, ICG argued that the Kosovo
responsibility for foreign
government should be permitted to exercise immediate
162
policy, the budget and matters of law and order.
The external security of Kosovo would be provided by an international
military presence, with internal security being increasingly provided by the
internationally trained Kosovo Police Service. Potentially the trustee would be
able to call upon the international military force to ensure the protection of
minority rights, and could rely upon a 63monitoring mission to monitor the
effectiveness of the Kosovo Police Service.1
Finally, the ICG warns that "a viable future for Kosovo has to be based on
close integration with its neighbors," but that one should not "impose models of
integration that do not enjoy the support of the countries and the entities
concerned."164

The ICG argued that conditional independence, or earned recognition, was the
only final status option that satisfied all the key ingredients necessary for a stable
final status. While ICG recognized that Kosovo was not yet prepared to exercise
full sovereignty, it reasoned that through a process of conditional independence it
would be able to earn this right and gradually prove itself capable of full
According to the ICG, conditional independence would also
independence.
solidify Kosovo's status as an entity outside the sovereign control of the FRY.
International aid and investment, currently discouraged by the uncertainty in
Kosovo, would increase with a certain final status, and would remain in Kosovo as
it would be unimpeded by fears that a fledgling nation might prove itself unworthy
of such inflow. The ICG also argued that by "remaining on probation, Kosovo
Albanians would have a strong 5incentive to ensure that Kosovo would cease to be a
factor of regional instability."16
The ICG then addressed a number of arguments that had been presented
against the approach of earned sovereignty. First, the ICG disputed the notion that
maintaining an uncertain prospect for independence preserved stability. Rather, in
the view of the ICG, it was the lack of certainty over Kosovo's future that was a

161. Id. at 12.
162. Id. at 12-13.
163. The ICG makes the argument for fair representation of minorities in the judiciary and for
supervision of the judiciary by an international entity other than the trustee in order to preserve the
principle of separation of powers. International Crisis Group, supranote 149, at 12-13.
164. Id. at iv.
165. ICG supra, 13-14.
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major contribution factor to regional instability. The ICG also argued that the fear
of retaliation from the Serb community, which was frequently invoked as an
argument against earned sovereignty was unfounded as the democratically elected
Serbian government was unlikely to call for mass emigration in the face of final
status. Another argument often presented regarding Serbia is that final status for
Kosovo would lead to an increase in nationalist sentiment in Serbia, at the expense
of moderates and stability. ICG rebutted this claim by noting that, if the goal was
long-term stability, preservation of an unstable entity and, with it, the possibility of
another change to Serbia's geography and demographics would only prolong the
transition to a stable democracy. Finally, the ICG rebutted the claim that Kosovo
would set a precedent for other separatist movements in the region by presenting
the key difference between Kosovo and other areas, that "Kosovo's interim status
is underpinned by a UN Resolution that leaves the question of final status open.' 66
UNMIK's

STANDARDS BEFORE STATUS APPROACH

Adopting the key elements of earned sovereignty, UNMIK laid out in May
2002 an approach entitled "standards before status." The two cornerstones of the
approach were 1) a public declaration in June 2003, that the United Nations could
not foresee a return to direct Serbian control; and 2) the public release in July 2003
of a detailed set of benchmarks required of the Kosovo institutions. Michael
Steiner also publicly added that he ruled out the possibility "for Kosova's future: a
partition along ethnic lines."' 67 Steiner's development of an earned sovereignty
approach of standards before status came at a time when according to Western
observers in Prishtina, "Kosova is heading for independence sooner or later, and
that even 'almost everyone in Belgrade regards Kosova as lost' to Serbia".168
The standards before status policy sought to ensure that Kosovo possessed
sufficient institutions to govern an independent state, and that it would be a
democratic state which protected human and minority rights, thus diminishing the
need for continued shared international responsibility for Kosovo's sovereign
authority and functions.
According to UNMIK, the general prerequisites of the standards before status
approach were, "full compliance with and implementation of Resolution 1244 and
the Constitutional Framework. Multi-ethnicity, tolerance, security, and fairness
under normal conditions, without special measures."' 69 In particular, Mr. Steiner
70
placed significant emphasis on the creation of a multi-ethnic society.
166. ICG supra, 6-9.
167. RFE/RL Newsline, Southeastern Europe: Steiner Says No Return Of Kosova to Serbian Rule
(June 26, 2002) at http:/lwww.rferl.org/newline/2002/06/4-Seesee-260602.asp (last visited Mar. 1,
2003).
168. Id.
169. UN Mission in Kosovo, Standards Before Status, May 2002 available at
http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/focuskos/apr02/benchmarks-eng.pdf [hereinafter Standards Before
Status].
170. Press Release, United Nations, Highlights Of The Introductory Remarks At A Press
Conference By Michael Steiner, Special Representative Of The Secretary-General In Kosovo, June 27,
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Specifically, the benchmarks covered the areas of functioning democratic
institutions, rule of law, freedom of movement, refugee returns and reintegration,
economic reform and development, property rights, dialogue with Belgrade, and
the responsible operation of the Kosovo Protection Corps. 171
For each of these categories, UNMIK set forth goals, benchmarks, and
specific actions to be taken by the local community. For instance, with respect to
freedom of movement, UNMIK set the goal that "all communities can circulate
freely throughout Kosovo, including city centers, and use their language." 172 The
benchmark for measuring the attainment of this goal was the "unrestricted
movement by minorities without reliance on military or police." 173 The required
local action included "policy and sustained action by [local institutions] to promote
condemnation by
FOM [freedom of movement] publicly" and "[u]nprompted
' 74
holders of public office of obstruction and violence"'
With respect to the process for resolving final status, the United Nations
determined that it was necessary to meet these benchmarks before discussions on
final status could commence. 75 In essence, the UN determined that phase four of
earned sovereignty could not commence in the case of Kosovo until after the
conditions had in fact been met to a substantial degree. As explained by SRSG
Steiner, the rationale behind this approach was that "Kosovo can only advance
176
towards a fair and just society when these minimum pre-conditions are met."'
Moreover, Mr. Steiner argued, these standards also mirrored those that were
required to be considered for integration into Europe: "I offer this to you as an
'exit strategy' which is, in reality, an 'entry strategy' into the European integration
process. The benchmarks complement the preconditions that Kosovo needs to
meet to qualify for the Stabilisation and Association process." 177 According to the
United Nations press office, "the Parliament in Kosovo, the population, the
on the benchmark
political leaders and the government had agreed to concentrate
178
of a respected society before talking about the status issue."'
In deciding to not set a fixed date for final status talks, but to rather condition
the initiation of the process upon the achievement of specified conditions, the
United Nations seems to have determined both that discussions on final status
would generate political instability, which would undermine efforts to build
Kosovar institutions, and that when the Kosovar institutions were in fact able to
[hereinafter
available at http://www.unog.ch/news2/documents/newsenpc020627.htm
2002
Highlights].
171. See Standards Before Status, supra note 159.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Press Release, UNMIK, Address to the Security Council By Michael Steiner Special
Representative of the Secretary-General (Apr., 24 2002) available at http://www.unmikonline.org/
press/2002/pressr/pr719.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2003) [hereinafter Steiner Address to Security
Council].
176. Steiner Address to Security Council, supra note 165.
177. Id.
178. See Highlights,supranote 160.
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meet the criteria set forth in the standards before status approach, the independence
of Kosovo would be a relatively foregone conclusion. The view that standards
before status attempts to circumvent potentially cumbersome political negotiations
with Serbia and establish an irreversible final status for Kosovo is supported by
Steiner's declarations that Kosovo would not return to direct Serbian control and
by his general unwillingness to consult with FRY or Serbian officials concerning
any matters relating to Kosovo - as evidenced by his statement, "I will
not mix
1 79
into Belgrade affairs, and Belgrade will not mix in Prishtina's affairs."'
Mr. Steiner and the United Nations may also have calculated that in the 3-5
years it will take Kosovo to reach the standards of democratic self-governance, the
political elite in Serbia will have come to accept the inevitable loss of Kosovo and
the fact that it would be impossible for a truly democratic Serbia to retain
possession of a territory where nearly all two million of its inhabitants desire
independence.
The key to a successful implementation of standards before status will be the
continued devolution of authority to Kosovar institutions as required by Resolution
1244. According to Mr. Steiner he has begun, and will continue, to phase
responsibility for the exercise of sovereign authority and functions to Kosovar
institutions in order to prepare Kosovo for a final determination of its international
status. 80
CONCLUSION

The approach of earned sovereignty to the Kosovo conflict, which began in
1998 as a proposal by the Public International Law & Policy Group working with
the International Crisis Group has evolved over the past five years through peace
negotiations and UN Security Council Resolutions and subsequent interpretations
of those resolutions to now to serve as the foundation for the resolution of
Kosovo's final status.
During the course of its evolution, the basic elements of the approach were
further refined. In the wake of the NATO humanitarian intervention the first phase
of shared sovereignty, which initially involved a detailed and complicated
arrangement for dual sovereignty over Kosovo with substantial international
monitoring and some international administration, evolved into a phase of
excluded sovereignty. The first phase thus ended with the United Nations and
NATO excluding Serbia for exercising any sovereignty authority or functions on
the territory of Kosovo, only in the interim retaining Kosovo within the territorial
designation of the FRY. During the second phase, the international community
undertook an aggressive approach of institution building, including the election of
local and regional officials, but suffered from an initial institutional unwillingness
to transfer authority and functions to those institutions once established.
The benchmarks established in the third phase for increased transfer of
179. See Naegele, supra note 133.
180. Id.
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authority and functions, which were guided by the views of the Goldstone
Commission and the International Crisis Group, included traditional concerns such
as the protection of human and minority rights, the transformation to democratic
rule and the rule of law, and respecting the territorial integrity of neighboring
states. The attainment of these conditions soon became the primary, if not sole
focus, of the international presence in Kosovo. Phase four, the determination of
final status, which had been set with a clear date in the Rambouillet Accords, was
transformed into an ongoing process in the United Nations Standards before Status
doctrine whereby the international community required that the conditions in phase
three be substantially met prior to undertaking negotiations to settle Kosovo's final
status. In light of the heavy involvement of the international community in
Kosovo's transition it is predictable that even after independence the international
community will continue to undertake certain monitoring tasks to ensure the
continued compliance with phase three conditions.
Throughout its development and application in Kosovo, the earned
sovereignty approach competed for influence with the alternative approach of
stability through accommodation and was shaped by the compromises inherent in
the foreign policy decision making process. In the end, the debate yielded a more
refined approach which presents the greatest opportunity for facilitating a viable
and lasting settlement of the Kosovo conflict.

